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Abstract 
 
"Standard" information theory says nothing about the semantic content of 
information.  Nevertheless, applications such as evolutionary theory demand 
consideration of precisely this aspect of information, a need that has motivated a 
largely unsuccessful search for a suitable measure of an "amount of meaning".   
This paper represents an attempt to move beyond this impasse, based on the 
observation that the meaning of a message can only be understood relative to its 
receiver.  Positing that the semantic value of information is its usefulness in making 
an informed decision, we define pragmatic information as the information gain in 
the probability distributions of the receiver's actions, both before and after receipt 
of a message in some pre-defined ensemble.  We then prove rigorously that our 
definition is the only one that satisfies obvious desiderata, such as the additivity of 
information from logically independent messages.  This definition, when applied to 
the information "learned" by the time evolution of a process, defies the intuitions of 
the few previous researchers thinking along these lines by being monotonic in the 
uncertainty that remains after receipt of the message, but non-monotonic in the 
Shannon entropy of the input ensemble.  It follows that the pragmatic information 
of the genetic "messages" in an evolving population is a global Lyapunov function 
for Eigen's quasi-species model of biological evolution.  A concluding section argues 
that a theory such as ours must explicitly acknowledge purposeful action, or 
"agency", in such diverse fields as evolutionary theory and finance. 
 
Introduction 
 
By now, it is a cliché that the usual (Shannon) measure of information refers merely to 
the reduction in uncertainty resulting from the receipt of a message, and not to the 
meaning that the uncertainty reduction has to the receiver. Making this dichotomy 
between the amount of information contained in a message and the meaning of that 
information was, in some ways, a conceptual advance, because Shannon was interested 
in communication per se, as opposed to the content being communicated.  Nevertheless, 
many authors have suggested that a theory that totally ignored semantics was, in some 
sense, incomplete.   
 
For example, Warren Weaver's introduction to Shannon's seminal paper (Shannon and 
Weaver, 1962) observes that the effectiveness of a communications process could be 
measured by answering any of the following three questions  
A. How accurately can the symbols that encode the message be transmitted ("the 
technical problem")? 
B. How precisely do the transmitted symbols convey the desired meaning("the 
semantics problem")? 
C. How effective is the received message in changing conduct ("the effectiveness 
problem")? 
Weaver then observes that Shannon's paper --- and thus the entire edifice of what is now 
known as "information theory" --- concerns itself only with the answer to question A.  
The present paper, in contrast, attempts to address question C. 
 
Workers in evolutionary theory feel the need for a theory of "information semantics" 
particularly acutely.  Eigen (1971), in the same paper that introduces the quasi-species 
model, voiced the frustration of many authors when he wrote  
 
 Information theory as we understand it today is more a communication  
theory.  It deals with problems of processing information rather than of 
"generating" information.  It requires information to be present "ab initio" 
in a well defined form; It always requires "somebody" -- usually man --
to determine what to call "information" and what to call "nonsense." 
 
and, later in the same paper, 
 
This complementarity between information and entropy shows clearly the 
limited application of classical information theory to problems of 
evolution. It is of little help as long as information has not yet reached 
its "full meaning", or as long as there are still many choices for generating 
new information.  Here we need a new variable, a "value" parameter, 
which characterizes the level of evolution. 
 
Previous researchers have attempted to fill this need by assuming that the requisite 
measure of "amount of meaningful information" was equivalent to the "complexity" of a 
dataset.  In other words, they have confused Weaver's Level B with Level C.  The result 
is that, in the fifty or so years since Weaver's comments above, researchers still cannot 
agree upon a definition, let alone a theory of complexity. (For a critical review, see 
Atmanspacher and Weidenmann, 1999.  Other critical comments in Standish, 2001 make 
clear that little had changed in the intervening two years. ). 
 
Nevertheless, some of the results of that research can serve as a useful introduction to 
some of the ideas to be presented here.  Of particular note was Grassberger's observation 
(Grassberger, 1986; Grassberger, 1991) that a low measure of meaningful information 
can result either from regularity or from randomness --- just as the regular object admits 
a simple description because of its regularity, so the random object admits a simple 
description as a member of a simply described ensemble.  Expanding on that theme, 
Crutchfield and Young (1989) proposed an abstract notion of complexity "based on the 
information contained in the minimum number of equivalence classes obtained by 
reducing a data set modulo a symmetry''.   This definition offers the natural and generic 
dichotomy of macroscopic descriptions, which are given modulo the symmetry, and 
microscopic descriptions, which aren't.  Furthermore, Crutchfield (1991) subsequently 
showed that, under rather general conditions, the complexity of the data set modulo the 
symmetry has a single maximum relative to the complexity of the data set without the 
symmetry.  The high microscopic complexity regime then corresponds to "random" data 
in which the best macroscopic description is statistical. Unfortunately, for Crutchfield, 
and, more recently, for Standish (Standish, 2001), the relevant symmetry must be 
included explicitly in the analysis from the beginning, which seems to beg the 
fundamental question of how such symmetries should be identified in the first place. 
 
The conduct-changing, or "pragmatic" import of a message is distinct from complexity 
in Crutchfield's sense because the receiver can choose to ignore any structure in the 
messages that is deemed irrelevant.  Yet, judging from such reviews as Atmanspacher 
and Weidenmann (1999), this "pragmatic information" appears to have received little 
explicit attention.  About the only reference that we have been able to find on the subject 
after repeated web searches is Atmanspacher and Scheingraber (1991), the reference that 
inspired the present work.  These authors stop short of an explicit, quantitative definition 
of pragmatic information, but they do suggest that pragmatic information, like 
Crutchfield's complexity, must tend to zero in the extreme cases of "complete 
confirmation" and "complete novelty".  In the first case, the messages merely confirm 
previous knowledge, obviating any need to change behavior.  The uncertainty of what is 
to be sent, and thus the Shannon entropy of the underlying message ensemble tends to 
zero.  In the second case, in which the messages contain material completely unrelated to 
that which has come before, the messages cannot be understood, let alone acted upon, 
because there is no context. 
 
A fundamental assumption of the present work is that the practical meaning of 
information stems from its usefulness in making an informed decision.  One important 
implication of this claim is a natural, quantitative measure of pragmatic information, 
which is the impact of a message on the receiver's subsequent actions.  In contrast to the 
multitude of plausible definitions of complexity, we show that the pragmatic information 
measure is unique, up to an arbitrary choice of units, given certain natural assumptions.  
However, as Shannon also said about entropy, "the real justification of these definitions, 
 will reside in their implications."  
 
One of the implications of this definition of pragmatic information is at least some of its 
hypothesized behavior in the limits described above.  The limit of complete confirmation 
is established rigorously by Lemma 2, but, in the limit of complete novelty, we can show 
only that the pragmatic information has a fixed bound.  In the special case of process, 
though, we show that this bound is indeed zero.  
 
While the primary thrust of this paper is to introduce the mathematical theory, we 
demonstrate that the theory itself has ``pragmatic information'' by demonstrating --- with 
the same model that Eigen used to elaborate the need for such a theory --- that pragmatic 
information does indeed answer Eigen's call for a "value parameter, [for] the level of 
evolution."  Thus, the primary contributions of this paper are threefold: 
1. A quantitative definition of pragmatic information in a general setting that is unique 
in satisfying certain plausible postulates, as well as being demonstrably correct in the 
previously mentioned limits. 
2. A demonstration that pragmatic information is a global Lyapunov function for the 
quasi-species dynamics, regardless of initial conditions. This result can be viewed as 
an analogue of Boltzmann's celebrated H-Theorem of statistical mechanics (see, e.g. 
Thompson, 1972), at least for the "information generating" dynamics of the quasi-
species.  In other words, it is precisely pragmatic information that is being generated 
here. 
3. The identification of the infinite time limit of the pragmatic information of the quasi-
species as an important and potentially measurable parameter in evolutionary theory.  
As such, it is a more refined version of the "genomic complexity" introduced by 
Adami, et. al. (2000) to measure the growing number of conserved sites in the 
successful genomes of in silico selection experiments.  Presumably, as the 
corresponding phenotypes "learn" about the environment, they act as the "receiver" 
for "messages" regarding which genomes are viable there.  Under conditions to be 
specified below, the pragmatic information is the resulting entropy of the genome 
distribution.   When the conditions are satisfied, the theorems stated above imply that 
the ability of the environment to ``compute'' evolutionary fitness places quantitative 
limits on the amount that natural selection can change the entropy of the genome.  
 
The final section of the paper offers a context in which these results should be viewed. 
A Formal Definition of Pragmatic Information 
 
The simplest case is the one in which one of a finite number of alternatives is to be 
selected, and selected once and only once.  In this setting, pragmatic information is the 
mutual information between the ensemble of messages that could have been sent and the 
outcomes resulting from these messages.  A number of intuitively appealing properties 
of pragmatic information follow immediately from this definition.  In particular, many of 
the properties of Shannon information are shared by pragmatic information, as well as 
the uniqueness result described above. 
 
Suppose a decision maker, D, in some currents state, s, must choose among a set {a1, 
a2, aM} of alternatives, assumed to be finite only to avoid unnecessary technicalities.  
Suppose further that these choices lead to outcomes o ∈ O = {o1, o2, , oN}, some of 
which the decision maker finds preferable to others.   Finally, suppose that D 's 
decision-making ability is constrained by one or more of the following: 
• the mapping from the a 's to the o's is not deterministic, 
• D has imperfect information about which of the o's is, in fact, the best, 
• D is unable to process the available information optimally,  
• D is unable to guarantee that the decision made is the one actually implemented, 
possibly because of "environmental noise", e, 
• Etc. 
We reflect this indeterminacy by assuming that D 's decision would result in a selection 
from the alternatives with respective probabilities q = ( q1, q2, , qN).    
 
D is then presented with a "message" m, which may be the output of some process.  
Even with these new data, the best that D can do is to update the respective selection 
probabilities to pm = ( p1|m, p2|m, ... , pN |m) in such a way that the probability of a superior 
outcome is increased.   This framework, illustrated in Figure 1, suggests the following 
 
Definition. The pragmatic information, I
M 
(p; q), of the message ensemble 
M is the information gain in going from q to pm, averaged over all 
messages m ∈M, i.e. 
where ϕm is the marginal probability that message m was sent and  pi,m is 
the joint probability that message m was sent and outcome oi was 
realized. 
 
It will be assumed that, included in M is the "empty message",ν, which, by definition, 
results in no change to the a posteriori probabilities.  The presence or absence of the 
empty message in M makes no difference to the computation, as the terms involving ν 
evaluate to zero.  However, the ability to write qi = pi|ν will eliminate potential confusion 
in the discussion of joint and conditional pragmatic information below. 
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
Note also that Figure 1 is significantly different from the standard picture drawn in 
information theory textbooks, beginning with Shannon and Weaver (1962).  In contrast 
to "standard information theory," which considers only the receiver's ability to 
distinguish the received message from others in the ensemble, the decision maker is 
central to the present work.   
 
Our thinking here is informed by our experience in programming the guidance, 
navigation, and control system of the Space Shuttle project.  After the guidance system 
identified a desired course for the Shuttle, and after the navigation system decided what 
the current course of the Shuttle actually was, the flight control system tried to address 
any discrepancies by sending signals to the rudder, flaps, etc.  To use the terminology of 
Figure 1, the guidance and navigation systems are sources of messages to be received 
and acted upon by the "decision making" capabilities of the flight control system.  
However, the term "Decision Maker" as used in the Figure could also apply to an 
animal, a person, or even a number of people jointly making decisions.  What is 
important here is the notion of agency, that the decision maker "effects" its decision by 
purposeful action, a point that we discuss in detail in the concluding section of the paper. 
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It is this attempt at purposeful action that justifies the asymmetry between pm and q in 
the definition above.  Presumably, the new distribution is a better predictor than the old 
one as to which outcomes serve the stated purpose.  Also implicit in the definition --- 
through the requirement that qi > 0 for all i in order for the pragmatic information to be 
defined at all --- is the assumption that the messages cannot open up new possibilities, 
but merely alter the likelihoods of existing ones. 
 
Some Basic Lemmas 
 
Some elementary, but important properties of pragmatic information are contained in the 
following lemmas. 
Lemma 1: Pragmatic information can be written as the mutual information 
of M and O, which can assume any one of three equivalent 
characterizations in terms of the (Shannon) entropy (Shannon and 
Weaver, 1962).   
Let  
     H (M) = - ∑m ϕm log2 ϕm, 
the entropy of the message ensemble M, let  
     H(O) = - ∑i qi log2 qi, 
the entropy of the outcome ensemble O, let 
    H(O|M)= - ∑i,m  pi,m log2 pi|m , 
the conditional entropy of the outcomes, given the various messages , and let 
     H(M | O)
 
= - ∑ i,m  pi,m log2 p m| i, 
the conditional entropy of the messages, given a particular outcome.   Then 
             I
M
(p; q)
 
 = H(M)
 
 + H(O) - H(O,M) 
                = H(O) - H(O|M)
,
 
                  = H(M)
 
 - H(M | O) 
Because H(M | O) ≥ 0, it follows immediately from the third identity that  
 
Lemma 2:  The pragmatic information of a message ensemble is always 
bounded above by its Shannon entropy.    
 
Ref. 1 also proves, albeit in a different context, that 
 
Lemma 3:  I
M
(p; q)is invariant with respect to coordinate transformations 
and automorphisms of the outcomes.  In other words, I
M
(p; q)is 
dimensionless. 
 
Lemma 4:  I
M
(p; q)≥ 0, with equality only when q and pm coincide for all m. 
 
Proof:   The only extremum of I
M
(p; q)subject to ∑i pi|m  = 1 and ∑i  qi  = 1 found via 
Lagrange multipliers is the value I
M
(p; q) = 0 when q and pm coincide for all m.  It 
therefore suffices to check a single case where q and pm do not coincide to determine 
whether zero is a minimum or a maximum.  Choosing p1|m = 1 and pi|m  =  0 for i > 1, we 
see that I
M
(p; q) >  0 when q and pm do not coincide.  ! 
 
Lemma 4 implies the intuitively reasonable result that no pragmatic information accrues 
from processes in which the probabilities of the outcomes are preserved.  In particular, 
I
M
(p; q) = 0 unless the inputs to the decision process affect the computations 
underlying D's response.  Considerations such as this suggest the importance of the 
computational abilities of the receiver, but that is a subject for future research. 
 
Lemma 5: For all fixed q, I
M
(p; q) is a local maximum with pm lying on the 
vertices of the simplex pi|m ≥ 0, ∑i   pi|m  = 1.  Furthermore, there are no 
local maxima in the interior of the simplex (In other words, the 
maximal amount of pragmatic information accrues to messages that 
engender complete certainty, independent of the Shannon entropy of the 
message ensemble.). 
 
Proof:  For all pm = ( p1|m, p2|m, ... , pN |m) on the unit simplex,  
I
M
(q) = ∑i < N  pi|m log2 pi|m /qi + (1- ∑i < N pi|m) log2 (1- ∑i < N pi|m) ⁄ qN. 
Taking the partial derivative with respect to pj|m, with j < N, we have 
      
∂I
M
(q)  ⁄ ∂ pj|m =  log2 [pj|m ⁄ (1- ∑i < N pi|m)] ⁄ ln 2 +  log2 [qN  ⁄ qj ] ⁄ ln 2,  
which is monotone increasing in pj|m.  Therefore, by the chain rule, the directional 
derivative along any ray that extends through one of the verticies of the simplex into its 
interior must also be monotone increasing.  Because any interior maxima would have to 
be connected to one of the verticies by one such ray, along which I
M
 must increase until 
the intersection with the putative maximum, and then decrease, such maxima cannot 
exist.  Furthermore, for small pj|m, i.e. in the neighborhood of ej, the derivatives are large 
and negative, implying that small departures from ej decrease IM , so ej is a local 
maximum.  The pj|m 's can clearly be redefined so that this last argument applies to any of 
the verticies of the simplex.  ! 
Lemma 6:    I
M
(p; q) ≤   maxi  [- log2 qi] 
Proof:  Follows immediately from the definition and Lemma 5. ! 
 
 
 
Joint and Conditional Pragmatic Information 
 
We define I
M,N
(p; q), the joint pragmatic information of messages m ∈M and n ∈ N, as  
,
q
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where  pi,m,n is the joint probability that both messages m and n were sent and outcome oi 
was realized and pi |m,n is the corresponding conditional probability.  Similarly, the 
conditional pragmatic information of messages m ∈ M, given n ∈ N is   
Lemma 7:    I
M,N
(p; q)   = I
M|N
(p; q)  + I
N
(p; q) 
Proof:   
! 
The receiver of the messages can obviously make more inferences given both m∈M and 
n ∈N than from either m or n by themselves.  Hence, our definition of pragmatic 
information is consistent with a postulate of "semantic information" of Bar Hillel and 
Carnap (1953), who require that the semantic information of a message increase with the 
number of deductions that follow from the message.  This requirement, that 
I
M,N
(p; q) ≥ I
M
(p; q) 
is an immediate consequence of Lemma 7 and the fact (Lemma 4) that I
M|N
(p; q)≥ 0.  
Furthermore, if m can always be inferred from n, then I
M|N
(p; q) = 0.  This condition 
is one of "pragmatic sufficiency", named to suggest a sufficient statistic, knowledge of 
which is "sufficient" to answer a question of interest (See, for example, Silvey, 1975). 
We also have I
M|N
(p; q) = I
M
(p; q) ("pragmatic independence") of message ensembles M 
and N if the equivalent conditions 
 
pi|m,n , ⁄  pi|n =  pi|m, ⁄  pi|ν  ⇔ pi|m,n , ⁄  pi|m =  pi|n, ⁄  pi|ν  (3) 
hold for all m ∈M and n ∈ N (Recall that the symbol pi|ν, i.e. the probability of outcome 
oi when the null message has been sent, is another way of writing qi, the a priori 
probability of outcome oi.)   (3) implies that no n ∈ N can influence the processing of 
any m ∈ M and vice versa.  These conditions hold if pi,m,n = pi|ν ϕm ϕn for all values of 
these subscripts, but  
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Lemma 8:  The pragmatic independence of message ensembles M and N need 
not imply that all pairs m ∈M and n ∈ N are independent events in the 
standard probabilistic sense.  It is also possible for M and N to be 
pragmatically dependent and m ∈M and n ∈ N to be probabilistically 
independent events for all pairs m ∈M and n ∈ N. 
 
Proof:  Writing (3) using joint, rather than conditional probabilities, we have  
 
 
If i, m, and n can all assume the values 0 and 1, and  
for |a| ≤ 1/8 and |b| ≤ 1/8 - |a|, then ϕmn = 1/4 for all m and n, and ϕm  =  ϕn = 1/2 for all m 
and n.  Thus, ϕm ϕn = ϕmn for all m and n, but the condition for pragmatic independence 
does not hold.  Conversely, any family of probabilities chosen such that ϕm ϕn ≠ ϕmn, for 
some m and n, but pi,m = pi|ν ϕm , pi,n = pi|ν ϕn , and pi,m,n = pi|ν ϕmn for all m and n, will 
satisfy (4). ! 
 
The Uniqueness Theorem  
 
A fundamental property of Shannon information is the behavior of the information 
measure when the choice among the outcomes is broken down into two or more 
successive choices (Shannon and Weaver, 1962).  To consider the same situation for 
pragmatic information, let N be the number of elements of O, and, a priori, assign 
probability 1/N to each o ∈ O.  Assume further that O is partitioned into the K < N 
outcome classes O1, O2, , Ok , OK, with N1, N2, , Nk,  NK  outcomes in the 
respective classes.   
 
Definition (1) assigns pragmatic information Ij = log2(N/Nj) to any message in an 
ensemble that unambiguously eliminates all but the members of the jth class from 
consideration.  Less definitive messages might not provide sufficient grounds to 
eliminate the other classes completely; instead, such messages might change the a 
posteriori class probabilities from Nj/N to pj > 0 for more than one class. In that case, it 
might seem reasonable that the pragmatic information of such a message is the  
weighted sum of the Ij's.  However, the Ij 's were computed by assuming more 
information than is available; namely, the certainty that outcomes outside of the j th class 
had already been eliminated from consideration.  Definition (1) therefore subtracts from 
the weighted sum of the Ij's the Shannon information required to distinguish with 
certainty which class is not eliminated. 
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The above considerations are sufficient to determine the functional form of pragmatic 
information to within a constant factor, which is effectively a choice of units.  This fact 
is the content of  
 
Theorem 1. I
M
(p; q) as defined above is the unique continuous function of 
the 2N arguments, p = (p1, p2,  , pN) and q = (q1, q2,  , qN) such that  
 
i. If qi = 1/N for all N outcomes o∈O, and pi =1/P for oi ∈ O* ⊂ O, where O* 
has P < N elements, and pi = 0 for all other i, then IM(p; q) is 
monotone in P/N.  
 
ii. I
M
 (p; q) is additive for pragmatically independent messages. 
 
iii. If the outcome ensemble is partitioned into K sub-ensembles, O1, O 2 , 
 , OK ⊂ O, with N1, N2, , NK,  outcomes respectively, and I1, I2, , IK 
are the respective pragmatic information values when, respectively, 
O1, O 2 ,  , or OK contain oi with certainty, then, for general pj|m, the 
overall pragmatic information is the weighted sum 
 
   I
M
(p; q) = ∑m∈M,1≤j≤K  pj,mIj - H(O|M), 
 
where those symbols defined previously have the same meaning as 
before.  
 
Proof:  See Appendix I. 
 
The Pragmatic Information of a Process 
 
Pragmatic information can also accrue from the time evolution of a process, if 
measurement of the process's state is used to update a priori predictions.  This is really a 
special case of the above in which measurement(s) at various times are the only 
"messages" received.  For example, we might start with the prediction that the 
probability, pk(t2), of observing the process in state k at a given time t2 is simply the 
same as the probability, pk(t1), of this observation at a previous time t1.  The pragmatic 
information of the observation at t2 is then 
 
∑k pk(t2) log2[pk(t2)/ pk(t1)]. 
 
Alternatively, we might use the observed state, i, of the process at the previous time to 
predict the probability of state k at the subsequent time.  Assuming that both 
observations are to be made in the future, the pragmatic information of learning state k at 
the subsequent time, given the observation of state i at the previous time is 
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where we denote the joint probabilities of both observations by pi,k (t1, t2).  In the limit of 
complete novelty (maximum Shannon entropy) discussed above, we have pi(t1) = pk(t1) = 
pk(t2), for all states i and k, and for all times t1 and t2.   Since we also have pi,k (t1, t2) = 
pi(t1) pk(t2) in that case (Otherwise, the conditional entropy of the state at t2, given the 
state at t1 will not be a maximum.),  it follows that 
 
Lemma 9: The pragmatic information of a process is zero in the limit of 
complete novelty.  
 
We note the important role that additivity plays in the above.  
 
In the next section, the occupation probabilities will represent the probabilities of 
choosing an individual of each of the various types in a random sample of the 
population.  It is reasonable to assume that each such sample is independent of previous 
samples, in which case the joint pragmatic information formula simplifies to  
 
Application to the Quasi-species Model  
 
As an example of how pragmatic information can be applied, we return to the problem 
of evolution, which we now restate more explicitly as one of characterizing the 
information-gathering activity of the so-called quasi-species model (Eigen, 1971; Eigen 
and Schuster, 1979; Eigen, McCaskill, and Schuster, 1988).  For present purposes, the 
model can be viewed as a simplified model of Darwinian selection with mutation.  Here, 
the environment effectively "decides'' on the fitness of the phenotype corresponding to 
each given genotype, where a phenotype's fitness is defined to be its reproduction rate.  
The corresponding genotypes are the messages that inform the decision by determining 
the composition of subsequent generations. 
 
Given suitable assumptions (Eigen, 1971; Eigen and Schuster, 1979; Eigen, McCaskill, 
and Schuster, 1988), the quasi-species model describes, in the large population 
(continuous) limit, the relative frequencies x = (x1, x2, xi, ) of abstract "replicators'' 
subject to differential selection and mutation according to the ordinary differential 
equation 
 dx(t) ⁄ dt  = W x(t) - x(t) [1T W x(t)] = [W - Ω(t)] x(t),  (6) 
satisfying the constraint that 1T x(t) = 1 for all times, t.  Here, 1 is a column vector of all 
1's,  W is a square matrix whose diagonal elements Wii represent the rates at which 
replicators of type i are copied successfully, and whose off-diagonal elements, Wij, 
represent the rate at which type j is produced because of mutations while copying type i, 
[1T W x(t)] = Ω(t), and T is the transpose operation. It is usually assumed that W = RQ, 
where R is a diagonal matrix of replication rates, and Q is a symmetric matrix whose 
components Qij specify the probabilities of errors that result in a copy of species j instead 
of species i (Eigen, McCaskill, and Schuster, 1988).   These same authors cite references 
showing that W = RQ has real eigenvalues.  In any case, we have 
.
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  x(t) = eWt x(0)  ⁄  [1T eWt x(0)] = exp[Wt - ∫0t Ω(s) ds] x(0),  (7) 
 
where xi(0) is the population of each type of replicator at some initial time.  If Wij > 0 for 
all i and  j, and W1 > Wi for all i > 1, then 
        c ,    if i = 1, 
    lim  xi(t) ≈       (8) 
t → ∞           c [W1i  ⁄ (W11 - Wii)]  otherwise, 
 
   
where the normalization constant c = [1 + ∑ i>1 W1i ⁄ (W11 - Wii)]-1, independent of the 
initial conditions (Eigen, McCaskill, and Schuster, 1988).  Typically, W1i  ⁄ (W1 - Wi) << 
1, for all i > 1, so it appears that "natural selection" has acted on the system to identify 
the "fittest" replicator type and thus "generate" information.  Upon closer examination, 
though, the nature of this information proves elusive, as the same number of binary bits 
would be required to specify any particular sequence of the same length, regardless of its 
fitness.  Furthermore, the same kind of process is taking place, regardless of whether the 
initial conditions are  
• equal numbers of each different type of replicator,  
• a  population consisting only of replicators of type 1, or  
• a  population consisting only of replicators of some inferior type. 
 
Pragmatic information provides a meaningful measurement of the rate at which this 
process proceeds in each of these cases.  At each time t, the environment receives 
"messages" about the fitness of a particular replicator via the number of copies of that 
replicator's genome.  Prior to receipt of the messages (and the subsequent "processing'' 
that results in differential selection), the initial probability of selecting a replicator of 
type i at random from the system is qi = xi(0).  The probability of selecting a replicator of 
type i at subsequent time t is pi = xi(t).  That the pragmatic information provides a 
direction to quasi-species evolution, much as the Second Law of Thermodynamics 
directs thermodynamic processes, is the content of  
 
Theorem 2.  Pragmatic information is a global Lyapunov function for the 
quasi-species model if W = RQ, where R is a diagonal matrix with 
diagonal entries Rii ≠ 0 and where Q is symmetric.  In other words, the 
rate at which pragmatic information is generated by the quasi-species 
model if W = RQ is always positive for finite time, regardless of 
initial conditions, and it tends to zero in the infinite time limit. 
 
Proof: See Appendix II. 
A plot of x(t) and I(x(t); x(0)) in a typical case in which xT(0) = (0.49, 0.005, 0.49, 
0.005) in arbitrary units and  
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chosen to exhibit a variety of the possible behaviors of the xi's, is shown in Figure 2, 
below.   
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 
For non-zero mutation rates, Lemma 5 implies that  
lim I(x(t); x(0))  ≈ - c log2 x1(0)+ ∑ i>1 c log2[cW1i ⁄ xi(0)(W11 - Wii)]  (9) 
t → ∞  
  
        ≤ - log2 x1(0).      (10) 
 
Note that equality in (10) is achieved only when the mutation rate is zero.  For non-zero 
mutation rates, the optimizing ability of natural selection is limited by the "pragmatic 
noise" introduced into the selection process by random mutation.  The infinite time limit 
in (9), which monotonically decreases with an increasing average mutation rate, can thus 
be used as a natural measure of the relative strength of selective forces relative to 
mutation. 
 
Note also that in the limit of zero mutation, the solution to the quasi-species equation is a 
Boltzmann distribution with a temperature parameter that decreases as time progresses, 
establishing a direct physical correspondence between the quasi-species equation and a 
system cooling in thermodynamic equilibrium.  In fact, the well-known characterization 
of the Boltzmann distribution as that distribution with a given mean and maximum 
entropy (see, e.g. Haken, 1983) generalizes as follows: 
 
Lemma 10: For a given prior distribution q and a given value of  
 
<W> = ∑i Wii pi|m, 
 
the distribution pi|m that maximizes the pragmatic information given 
message m is  
pi|m = qi exp(µWii) ⁄    [∑k qk exp(µWkk)] 
 
where   µ is that unique value for which  
 
<W> = [∑k qk Wkk exp(µWkk)]  ⁄    [∑k qk exp(µWkk)] 
Proof:  The proof is a straightforward generalization of the Lagrange multipliers 
argument that justifies the result cited in Haken (1983).  For given m, the pragmatic 
information,  
 
is maximized for the given constraints (including the constraint that the a posteriori 
probabilities pi|m sum to unity) is an extremum at extrema of the Lagrangian  
 
Upon setting the derivatives of L with respect to pk|m for all k, λ, and µ to zero and 
solving simultaneously, the result follows. ! 
 
This result might be viewed as a justification for using the Boltzmann distribution in 
simulated annealing (see, for example, Kirkpatrick, et. al., 1983, for a description of the 
algorithm.). 
 
On the Notion of Agency  
 
Up until now, science has dismissed the notion of agency in, for example, biology, as 
"teleological".   Nevertheless, Kauffman (2000) makes a compelling case for considering 
"autonomous agents" in a wide variety of disciplines, including economics and 
evolutionary theory.  While Kauffman's agents can also reproduce and perform at least 
one thermodynamic cycle, their most fundamental property is precisely their ability to 
act purposefully to further their goals (Kauffman's endowment of his agents with the 
ability to reproduce and the need to perform thermodynamic cycles suggests the obvious 
goal of obtaining the resources required for reproduction and maintenance.). 
 
Having shown that pragmatic information is an order parameter in measuring the 
"decisiveness" of the environment in the quasi-species model, we speculate that it might 
serve equally well in some of the other contexts that Kauffman considers.  For example, 
the "efficient market hypothesis" that undergirds essentially all of modern finance is 
succinctly, but precisely stated as the claim that the pragmatic information of previous 
price histories is zero. 
 
The best scientific theories seek to explain some range of phenomena in terms of a 
parsimonious set of principles that are "nearer to hand" than obscure, if fundamental 
truths.  The price paid for this conceptual transparency is the approximation of complex 
microscopic behavior by single macroscopic quantities, such as friction, ferro-
magnetization, and the like.  Unfortunately, these "order parameters" must be written 
into the theory "by hand;" in fact, identifying appropriate order parameters is often the 
crux of formulating the appropriate theory! 
 
The present approach skirts this problem by asking a question that is often easier to 
address; namely, what aspects of the situation are determinants of behavior.  This 
approach fits naturally into Rosen's "relational biology" (Rosen, 1991).  Central to this 
vision is the concept of function, which, Rosen objectifies via the following question:  
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"Suppose  we are given a system, or better, a state that is perceptibly 
heterogenious; one part looks different, or behaves differently from 
another part.  If we leave the system alone, some autonomous behavior 
will ensue.  On the other hand, we can ask  ca question like:  if we were to 
remove, or change, one of these distinguishable parts, what would be the 
effect on that behavior?" (Italics in the original). 
  
Clearly, the present paper is nothing but an answer to that question for the quasi-species. 
 
The above quotation was taken from Rosen's monograph, Life Itself (Rosen, 1991), 
which makes a persuasive case that the reductionistic methods of contemporary science 
are inadequate to the task of understanding living organisms.  Not coincidentally, this 
same monograph contains one of the few references in the modern scientific literature to 
Aristotle's Theory of Causation.  Where modern science might seek the cause for a 
particular phenomenon, Aristotle would identify no less than four different kinds of 
causation, "formal cause", "material cause", "efficient cause", and "final cause".   The 
first three of these coincide with contemporary scientific ideas of causation --- material 
causation corresponding to the initial conditions leading to a particular phenomenon, 
formal causation corresponding to the set of dynamical rules to be applied to the initial 
conditions, and efficient causation with the particular application of the rules to the 
particular initial conditions to produce the phenomenon in question.  In contrast, modern 
science barely acknowledges final causation, the category Aristotle considered most 
important, because final causation implies purposeful action. 
 
Historically, this reluctance to consider final causation was a step forward, because it 
directed attention towards observation and measurement, and away from sterile 
theological debate.  Nevertheless, Rosen argues, biology cannot be properly understood 
without at least some consideration of final causation.  In place of his book-length 
defense of this thesis, we close with the quotation from Rosen's mentor, Nicholas 
Rashevsky, that Rosen uses to preface his argument: 
 
It is important to know how pressure waves are reflected in blood vessels.  
It is important to know that diffusion drag forces may produce cell 
division.  It is important to have a mathematical theory of complicated 
neural networks.  But nothing so far in these theories indicates that the 
proper functioning of arteries and veins is essential for the normal course 
of the intracellular processes; nor does anything in those theories indicate 
that a complex phenomenon in the central nervous system  [is] tied up 
with metabolic processes of other cells in the organism.  And yet this 
integrated activity of the organism is probably the most essential 
manifestation of life. 
 
So far as the theories mentioned above are concerned, we may just as well 
treat, in fact, do treat, the effects of diffusion drag forces as a peculiar 
diffusion in a rather specialized physical system, and we do treat the 
problems of circulation as special hydrodynamic problems.  The 
fundamental manifestation of life mentioned above drop out from all our 
theories in mathematical biology. 
 
We must look for a principle which connects the different physical 
phenomena involved and expresses the biological unity of the organism 
and the organic world as a whole. 
 
The goal of the present paper, by making explicit the role of agency in information 
processing, is to help biology to move beyond the "mere syntax" of the "rather 
specialized physical system" towards a more "organic" view of life. 
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APPENDIX I:  PROOF OF THEOREM 1 
 
As was noted above, messages are pragmatically independent if they are the 
concatenation of probabilistically independent component messages that refer to 
probabilistically independent sub-events.  We consider the case in which there are n such 
message component, sub-event pairs.  In the spirit of condition  i, we assume that the a 
priori probability of the outcome of each sub-event is 1/N, that the a posteriori 
probability is 1/P, and that the pragmatic information of each outcome is A(N/P).  The 
respective a priori and a posteriori probabilities are 1/Nnand 1/Pn.  Thus, by additivity, 
A(Nn/Pn) = n A(N/P), for all n, P, and N.  Because there exists choices of the integers N 
and P such that the ratio N/P approximates any real number greater than or equal to 
unity, the continuity of A guarantees that A(tn) = n A(t) for all real t ≥1 and all N.  This 
last result is sufficient to guarantee (Shannon and Weaver, 1962) that A(t) = c log t, for 
some constant c and all real t > 1.  The constant can be interpreted as a choice of units, 
or the choice of the base of the logarithm, which is effectively the same thing.  As in the 
Shannon theory, it is natural to use base 2 logarithms.  
 
Suppose next that the original N a priori outcomes have been partitioned into K classes, 
each of which has Nj elements, for 1 ≤ j ≤ K.  If each outcome has the same a priori 
chance of being selected, the a priori probability that the selected outcome is in class j is 
Nj /N.  Furthermore, if the a posteriori probability of selecting an outcome from class j, 
given that message m is received is Pj|m, then, by condition iii and the previous 
paragraph,  
   I
M
(q)  = ∑ m∈M ∑ 1≤j≤K  ϕm pj| m log2 (N/Nj) - H(O|M), 
    =∑ m∈M ∑ 1≤j≤K  ϕm pj| m log2 ( pj| m N/Nj) 
Because values of Nj and N can be found that approximate any given probability qj, the 
theorem follows. ! 
APPENDIX II:  PROOF OF THEOREM 2 
 
 
Having demonstrated above that pragmatic information is zero if and only if the a 
posteriori and a priori distributions coincide, that it attains its unique maximum at one 
of the verticies of the unit simplex, and that limt →∞ dI(x(t); x(0)) ⁄ dt = 0, we need only 
show dI(x(t); x(0)) ⁄ dt > 0 for all finite times.  We have 
 
Using the matrix-vector form of the given differential equation to eliminate the 
derivatives in the sum above and the fact that Ω(t) -Ω(r) is a multiple of the identity 
matrix, we also have  
 
 
The second sum in the second line vanishes, because it is proportional to 1T dx(t)/dt = 0 
for all times, t.   To verify that the remaining sum is positive, set z = (t-r)/2 and s = 
(t+r)/2, so that  
  x(t) = exp[Wz - ∫st Ω(s) ds] x(s), 
and 
  x(r) = exp[-Wz + ∫rs Ω(s) ds] x(s). 
Thus, because exp[± Wz] commutes with W for all z, the theorem will follow if, for all 
vectors x(s) , 
 
or,  
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where D is a diagonal matrix with all diagonal elements positive and y is any real vector 
of appropriate dimension.  We exploit the special form of W to write  
 
W = RQ = R1/2 (R1/2T H) Λ(TR1/2 ) R-1/2, 
 
where Λ is the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues of Q, and T is the unitary matrix of 
eigenvectors of Q.  Since Q is symmetric, Λ must be real.  Thus,  
 
exp(Wz)H D exp(-Wz)= R-1/2 (R1/2TH) eΛz (TR1/2 ) R1/2 D R1/2 (R1/2T H) e-Λz (TR1/2 ) R-1/2  
 
   = T H eΛzTETH e-ΛzT, 
 
where E is a diagonal matrix with positive, real entries, even if one or more of the 
diagonal entries of R is negative (They cannot be zero by hypothesis.).  It follows that S 
= TETH is symmetric, positive definite, and that P = eΛzSe-Λz, as a similarity transform 
of S, has positive, real eigenvalues, λ1, λ2,  , λN.  In addition, the column vectors, v1, 
v2,  , v N, of eΛzT are eigenvectors of P that span CN.  We note the orthogonality of 
these vectors, since (eΛzT) (eΛzT)H = e2Λz.  Using the fact that the v's span CN, we find 
constant α1, α2,  , αN such that  
 
Ty = ∑i αi vi, 
 
The theorem follows since  
 
y H exp(Wz)H D exp(-Wz) y  =  (∑i αi vi) H P (∑i αi vi) 
=  (∑i α*i vi H) (∑i αi λi vi) 
=  ∑i |αi|2 λi exp(2λi z) 
      >  0.  
 
! 
[ ] [ ] ,yzzy HH 0exp exp >− WDW
FIGURE CAPTIONS 
 
Figure 1:  Conceptual framework for pragmatic information.  Details are explained in 
the text. 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Time course of relative frequencies of various "replicators" evolving as 
described in the text, Equation (7), using the parameter matrix given in the text. 
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